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Abstract
Background: Problems with misallocation and redirection of critical resources and benefits intended for PLHIV
are not uncommon in Kenya. This study explores corruption in Kenya’s HIV response system and the implications
for health outcomes from the perspective of people living with HIV (PLHIV). Although they might not be directly
responsible for health care fund management, PLHIV and their advocacy efforts have been central to the development
of HIV system response and they have a vested interest in ensuring proper governance.
Methods: This phenomenological study was conducted in 2012 in Kiambu County in Kenya. The study was designed
to capture the experiences of a select group of individuals living with HIV and AIDS and subsequent effects on
intergenerational wealth transmission. Four focus groups were conducted with self-convened HIV/AIDS peer support
groups. Findings related to corruption emerged unexpectedly, albeit consistently, across all four focus groups. To
validate core themes within the data, including corruption, two coders independently reviewed and coded the data.
Results: Participants described incidences of resource misallocation, theft, and denial of services across three thematic
levels namely at the interpersonal, provider, and institutional levels. Participants described the negative influence
of corruption on their health and financial well-being, and propose: (1) strengthening legal protections for assets
belonging to PLHIV, (2) direct representation of PLHIV within service agencies, (3) and addressing information
asymmetries to inject transparency into the response system.
Conclusion: Our findings add to the growing literature that identifies advocacy among individuals and families
impacted by HIV and AIDS to be a useful tool in drawing attention to harmful practices in the HIV response
infrastructure; consistent with this movement, communities in Kenya demand greater control over programmatic
interventions both at the national and local levels.
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Background
Kenya continues to have one of the highest HIV prevalence
rates in the world [1]. High prevalence and HIV/AIDS re-
lated deaths prompted the Kenyan government to declare
HIV a national disaster in 1999. Although the rate of new
HIV/AIDS infections in Kenya has declined steadily since
the late 1990s, when the highest rates were recorded [2, 3],
1.6 million Kenyans are reportedly living with HIV [3]. Ken-
ya’s HIV response system is multi-sectorial in nature, char-
acterized by a network of services provided through an
array of Ministries and State Departments, County Govern-
ments, and various arms of the private and corporate sectors
[3]. This broad and overarching response system uses a so-
cial justice perspective to integrate prevention and health
services, research and development, and organizational de-
velopment [3]. At the national level, financing and adminis-
tration of testing and treatment services is the responsibility
of the Ministry of Health through The National AIDS and
STI Control Program (NASCOP). Other government minis-
tries—such as the Ministry of Labour, Social Security, & Ser-
vices; Ministry of Education, Science, & Technology—are
responsible for administering and delivering auxiliary ser-
vices such as economic empowerment supports for vulner-
able families, education bursaries for children orphaned or
made vulnerable by AIDS, and enforcement of anti-
discrimination policies.
Although the Kenyan government has developed pub-
lic agency infrastructure for delivering HIV services, only
18 % of these expenditures are financed through public
coffers. Rather, the extensive healthcare needs have
meant that the lion’s share of the HIV response costs are
borne by international development partners, the cor-
porate sector, and private households [4]. It was esti-
mated that Kenyans spent over US$ 98 million on out of
pocket costs in HIV related care in 2011/12 accounting
for 13 % of the response system. PLHIV spend approxi-
mately seven times more than what the average Kenyan
spends on health care [4] which includes medical costs
associated with HIV and HIV related illnesses. In 2012,
the private and corporate sectors contributed approxi-
mately US$ 15.93 million to the HIV response system.
They do this providing work place programs such as in-
terventions dealing with stigma and gender relations,
pharmaceutical treatment, and inpatient and outpatient
care [4]. Finally, international development partners play
an integral part in the HIV response system by bearing a
significant share of the cost burden—approximately
70 % between 2009/12. This over – reliance on inter-
national donor supports raises concerns about the Kenya
government’s ability to sustain the response effort.
Corruption in Kenya
Problems with misallocation and redirection of critical
resources and benefits intended for PLHIV are not
uncommon in Kenya, where corruption is widespread.
In a worldwide corruption perceptions index, Kenya was
ranked 139 out of 168 nations, with 43 % of those sur-
veyed perceiving corruption as a problem in the health
care sector alone [5]. Corruption is defined as public
servants’ abuse of their position for personal gain [6].
Kenyans have extensive personal experience with cor-
ruption; 77 % of those surveyed about corruption in
Kenya reported that someone in their households paid a
bribe to the police, 54 % to public registry departments,
and 35 % to medical healthcare providers [5]. Within
health care and other public systems that support
PLHIV, corruption can also manifest as a variety of be-
haviors among decision makers within public agencies,
provider facilities, and community groups. Other exam-
ples include kickbacks for procurement decisions, em-
bezzlement, fraudulent claims of services rendered, theft
of funding or supplies, charging individuals for services
or products that should be free, providing poor quality
care, diverting individuals away from public benefits,
and excessive absenteeism among providers [7–9].
Bribes and corrupt behaviors may be used both by
consumers as a conduit to access legitimate services or
by decision makers to gain access to unmerited goods
and services.
Regardless of the level at which it occurs, corruption
obstructs the delivery of resources, services, medications,
and benefits to those who are most in need, unduly
impacting low-income Kenyans, and can lead directly to
poor health outcomes [10, 11]. Unchecked corruption
threatens the stability of international aid, health pro-
gramming [12], and national economic growth [13]. In
addition, corruption can lead to distrust in public insti-
tutions and healthcare providers. Especially in health-
care, where patients rely on professionals to consider
their best interests, distrust limits individuals’ motivation
and likelihood of accessing needed services, and com-
promises personal health [14, 15].
Conditions that drive corruption
Although corruption among public officials is often
driven by individual factors, their behavior is also
heavily influenced by organizational, institutional, and
cultural contexts [6, 16]. In many cases, corruption is
motivated by the potential for personal financial
gains, friendship, or family, but made possible by
ample opportunity to engage in these behaviors with-
out being held accountable [6]. As large sums of
international aid are dispersed throughout complex
public systems, weak governance infrastructure, lim-
ited integrity policies, poor supervision, and wide ran-
ging personal discretion in decision making allow
public officials to misdirect resources without being
detected [7, 16]. Another factor may be that decision
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makers feel justified in accepting a bribe because they
feel their work is inadequately rewarded [17].
Furthermore, personal, organizational, or cultural
values that enable public officials to rationalize their be-
havior can drive corruption. For instance, weak ethical
values, strong social norms, or cultural taboos such as
the social stigma associated with HIV/AIDS could legit-
imate corrupt behaviors [6]. Kenya’s political structure
and ethnic heterogeneity has been viewed as a driver of
corruption. Kenya has had a long history of political pa-
tronage driven by ethnic and regional motivations. The
result has been economic inequalities along ethnic, and
by extension, geo-political boundaries [18, 19]. These in-
equalities have bred an environment of ethnic cronyism
where individuals engage in corrupt activities not purely
for private gain but also for the benefit of fellow tribes-
men. Indeed, Orjuela [20] cautions that in societies
where group identity is paramount, corrupt behaviors
and actions in pursuit of “personal again” could extend
to include the “collective gain” of a particular group.
Fighting corruption often requires multiple comple-
mentary measures that target internal governance, im-
prove transparency, and engage the public in promoting
accountability. Internal accountability mechanisms that
tighten personnel management, procurement, and over-
sight processes can reduce the opportunity to misallocate
resources. For instance, instituting staff performance
appraisals, codes of ethical conduct, mechanisms for
reporting and subsequent sanctions for misconduct, and
financial incentives for performance could minimize op-
portunities, pressures, and acceptance of corruption [9].
To complement internal governance initiatives, external
mechanisms are needed that engage the public in promot-
ing accountability among systems, providers, and other
decision makers. Provider report cards, consumer advo-
cacy or advisory groups, complaint boxes, and health
facility charters that advertise the cost of services can
promote transparency and information dissemination to
the community, empowering patients to challenge corrup-
tion [21–23].
Consumer advocacy and the global HIV response
In 1978, the World Health Organization introduced the
idea of local involvement and control in the design and
implementation of health systems as a necessary mech-
anism to effectively address public health issues, particu-
larly in the global South [24]. UNAIDS guidelines
requiring community engagement were established in
2000. Initially, engagement was focused on research par-
ticipation and protections through Community Advisory
Boards (CAB) but engagement has since expanded to
more broad participation in research, advocacy, program
and policy design, and service delivery. Effective com-
munity engagement processes are based on: 1) authentic
participation of a representative group of stakeholders,
2) mutual trust between community and partners, and
3) shared power [25]. Engaged community may lead to
greater transparency in the research and implementation
processes [26], re-direction of resources to areas of high-
est need, [27, 28] and locally appropriate services [29].
Consumer advocacy is also associated with increased pa-
tient trust in providers. As consumers develop stronger
trust in healthcare professionals, they may be more likely
to comply with treatment [26, 30]. From a service
provision perspective the use of unpaid volunteers in
service provision is geared towards increasing the
chances of program sustainability. It should be noted
that community volunteers account for approximately
40 % of community based organizations’ (CBO) budgets.
This is especially salient given that in Kenya funding
most likely comes from external donors and is limited
(average annual budgets equal approximately US$
15,000) [31]. However, reliance on under- or uncompen-
sated labor, particularly in communities where needs are
great, could be construed as exploitative and is indeed
unsustainable in the long run [32]. Thus, even in sys-
tems with strong consumer advocacy and involvement,
there still remains a strong risk of the misalignment of
resources to local needs.
Methods
This study explores consumers’ experiences in Kenya’s
HIV response system and describes corruption and im-
plications for personal health and well-being. Consumers
[1] describe instances of corrupt behavior at multiple
levels of the system, [2] explain the effect of corruptive
behaviors on personal health and well-being, and [3]
identify potential strategies for improving governance
and accountability within the healthcare system.
This phenomenological study was conducted in 2012
in Kiambu, Kenya. Phenomenology allows for the ex-
ploration of lived experiences. Unlike grounded theory
which focuses on the objective generation or discovery
of theory, the phenomenological approach seeks to un-
earth the deeper meaning of experiences solely from the
perspective of an individual’s life experiences [33, 34].
Furthermore, this technique aims to reduce the degree
to which conceptualizations of the phenomena are
superimposed on research participants’ re-telling and
understanding of their experiences. Given the dearth of
information on the phenomenon of intergenerational
wealth transmission in households at the confluence of
poverty and chronic illness, this study was originally de-
signed to capture these experiences among a select
group of heads of households. Four focus groups were
conducted with self-convened HIV/AIDS peer support
groups in the region. In light of the original study’s focus
on personal and family asset holdings, the findings
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related to corruption presented in this manuscript
emerged unexpectedly, although consistently, across all
four focus groups.
Study design, setting, and population
Kiambu County is home to a mixed economy, with in-
dustries and large scale farms on the one hand and small
subsistence land holdings and informal housing settle-
ments (slums) on the other. The County Integrated
Poverty Plan 2013-17 places the county’s poverty rate at
21.75 %. Kiambu county’s HIV prevalence rate stands at
3.8 % and ranks 38th among Kenya’s 47 counties [35].
Admittedly, Kiambu County has inadequate health care
services with a doctor/patient ratio of 1:17000 and the
nurse/patient ratio at 1:1300. In addition the county has
one level-five hospital, namely, Thika District Hospital
[36]. Although located in a region predominated by the
Kikuyu tribe, the county’s proximity to the capital city
Nairobi and its peri-urban economy means that it is
home to Kenyans from all ethnicities. Kenya has at least
40 different ethnic tribes each with unique intergenera-
tional wealth transmission norms and rules. We docu-
mented understanding of this issue from different
cultural perspectives by deliberately seeking peer support
groups that were as culturally diverse as possible, al-
though homogeneity was not an exclusion criteria.
A community gatekeeper assisted with recruitment by
publicizing the study among local support groups. The
gatekeeper had access to these groups through her par-
ticipation with the local Constituency AIDS Control
Committee (CACC). CACC’s are local bodies charged with
the coordination of HIV and AIDS activities. HIV Peer sup-
port groups are required to register with their local CACC
[37]. Participating groups were those that were able to con-
vene with at least ten group members present and had to
be able to commit at least two hours to the interview.
These recruitment procedures yielded a diverse sam-
ple, with regard to age, gender, and tribe. Of the 45
respondents 67 % were female. The respondents ranged
in age from 28 to 63 years (M = 42.9, SD = 8.52).
Household size ranged from 2 to 9 individuals (M = 4.9,
SD =2.02) and with the exception of four respondents,
all others were living in a household with at least one
child under the age of 18 years. All respondents self-
identified as major decision makers in their households.
Only eight (18.6%) of this sample had completed sec-
ondary school, while nine (20.9 %) had not completed
primary school education. Participants self-identified as
Kamba, Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo thereby providing
a diverse cultural perspective.
Data collection and analysis
Data were collected through four in-depth focus group
interviews and a brief six question close-ended survey
with each respondent participating in only one focus
group discussion. Focus group interviews are especially
advantageous as a research method as a heterogeneous
group is more likely to elicit lively conversations that
lend to comparing and contrasting experiences, thereby
providing a nuanced description of the phenomenon.
Interviews were conducted in Kiswahili (national lan-
guage), English, Kikuyu, and Sheng (slang). The first au-
thor is fluent in all of these languages. Focus group
interviews were digitally recorded with each groups’ per-
mission, and flip charts used to highlight the key words
and major points that emerged throughout each inter-
view session. A research assistant (with certification in
human subjects’ research) was also present to assist with
facilitation. Transcriptionists were hired to transcribe
and translate the data into English. The first author
checked all transcriptions and translations to ensure ac-
curacy and consistency.
Data were analyzed using AtlasTi software [38]. A phe-
nomenological data analysis approach was used [33, 34].
To enhance the process, two coders—the first author
(coder #1) and the second author (coder #2) independ-
ently reviewed the transcripts. It should be noted that
coder #1 is Kenyan, has previously analyzed these data
for other themes, and has been immersed in this litera-
ture for close to a decade while coder #2 is North
American and has substantial experience working with
qualitative data. To check for and avoid the introduction
of assumptions, interpretations, and meanings exogen-
ous to the transcripts as provided by the participants,
both coders independently engaged in a neutral appraisal
of the transcripts to establish a global understanding of
the interviews. This process ensured completeness be-
cause each coder would ideally identify meaning units
on account of their different theoretical backgrounds,
world view and biases. In the second round of analysis,
both coders met to discuss the emergent meaning units
and to integrate these units into meaningful structures.
After several iterations, this part of the data analysis
process identified two levels at which corruption of re-
sources takes place, namely provider and institutional
levels. The final round of data analysis deconstructed the
data further by attempting to understand what these
different levels of misappropriation tell us about this
population’s experiences. Connecting these two themes
to the numerous examples in the data, the coders
were able to explain this phenomenon by exemplify-
ing how misappropriation takes place, the conse-
quences on well-being, and suggested solutions to
address the identified gaps.
Results
The issue of corruption as it relates to the well-being of the
groups was mentioned and discussed throughout all four
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focus groups. Participants described incidences of resource
misallocation, theft, and denial of services across two the-
matic levels namely at the provider and institutional levels.
Under each thematic level, quotations derived from re-
spondents’ perceptions of how corruption manifests in
their lives, their interpretation of its impact on overall well-
being, and proposed solutions are presented. Table 1 Par-
ticipants identified a system of service provision, which
was fraught with corruption. The discussion further
evolved into examples of how the lack of accountability
emboldens individuals to either deny services or game the
system for personal or collective gain. Focus group partici-
pants identify ways in which at the institutional level gov-
ernment agents, international donors, and the research
community engage in practices that could be construed as
disadvantageous to PLHIV. Finally, participants identify
ways in which institutions could provide greater PLHIV
protections and ownership of the response system.
Service providers
This section presents narratives discussing experiences
with service providers, including health care workers,
community workers, and bankers. Given the differences
in the roles and functions of facility-based health
workers and community-based health workers, data on
these two groups are presented separately. In addition,
given the Kenyan Government’s integration of economic
empowerment interventions as a component of the HIV
response system [3] and the critical role income and as-
sets play in the health and well-being of impacted house-
holds, participant discussions that revolve around
banking representatives are included in this section.
In discussions revolving around facility-based health-
care providers, participants described situations where
workers denied them services. Specifically, female re-
spondents from Group D discussed how the intersection
of HIV, stigma, and tribalism in Kiambu County resulted
in a delay of health services. In addition to stigmatization
by doctors and other hospital workers, these women de-
scribed an instance where hospital staff were heard to at-
tribute this delay of service to their tribal affiliation. Here,
the women speak of arriving at the hospital early only to
have other patients seen before them…
Respondent 1: That one was attended to, then the
third one was called, and they kept calling others in
for treatment, until they got to the tenth person, and I
was just sitting there. I started to ask why I am not
being called in yet I was there first. I found my file on
the table but it had been kept aside. When I asked,
they told me that I was bringing a disturbance, step
outside come in only after I have called you in.
Respondent 2: I was there that day and she is not the
only one who was affected, I too was affected.
Respondent 1: So I went outside and I overheard the
social worker and the doctor, I don’t know who else
was in the room but it’s just the people who work
there, I overheard them say, “That one is a Luo (tribe),
she will have to wait”. I was very hurt. I went in and
asked them, “doesn’t a Luo deserve treatment?”
It should be noted that upon further probing, respon-
dents from this group did confirm that this denial of service
was due to discrimination based on both their HIV status
and tribal affiliations: “here in Thika District, sometimes
people are discriminated against because of their tribe”.
Group D. In instances such as these, hospital staff priori-
tized care for patients with a similar tribal affiliation by
delaying treatment to patients from different ethnic groups.
However, this group also acknowledged that the system is
improving and the situation is not as dire as it once was.
Further, participants noted service delivery differences
across different service delivery settings. In particular,
Group D provided examples to illustrate county varia-
tions in public HIV care. It should be noted that theoret-
ically county level services should follow comparable
administrative, payment, and care procedures. Partici-
pants noted how stark differences in costs and services
are unfair, and arouse their suspicions about the proper
use and disbursement of national resources that
Table 1 Emergent thematic levels
Thematic Levels
Service providers Institutional
What is experienced – Theft of resources designated for PLHIV
– Misdirection of resources from PLHIV to the public
– Denying services due to ethnicity and HIV
– Bribing officials to amend/issue legal documents
– Misdirection of resources from PLHIV to the public
– Difficult to access service system
How it manifests and affects PLHIV – Heightens the cost burden of the diagnosis
– Longer hospital wait times
– Hard to access bank loans
– Lack of support services
– Consumers are denied ownership of the response
system
Proposed solutions – Representation within the response system
– Equity
– Legal protections of PLHIV Representation within the
response system
– Transparency
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hospitals receive to serve them. These regional differ-
ences are especially pertinent given well documented in-
stances of ‘tribalism’ and regional disparities in national
resource allocations [19, 20] previously noted:
Respondent: I am part of a support group in
Maragwa. When you go to the clinic in Maragwa, the
first thing you are given tea because you arrived early,
it is assumed that you have had nothing to eat. If
lunch time finds you there you are given lunch. When
it’s time to go home you are given two hundred
shillings for transport… If you go to the hospital there
suffering from the flu, you won’t have to buy medicine.
You do not even need to buy a card. However, here
where we live, we do not see things like those.
They do not reach us. We wonder where they go to.
In addition to regional service delivery differences, var-
iations in the way providers treat PLHIV were noted be-
tween public and private care facilities “So I went to the
private health center called Mulumba (St. Mulumba)
and I am normally treated very well. I was very discour-
aged at the government run ones” Group D. Although
the circumstances surrounding the quality of treatment
provided at the public center are unclear, when con-
sumers feel unwelcome, they may not seek needed
treatment thereby compromising adherence and reten-
tion into care. Participants continued to describe their
skepticism about the proper use of resources when they
are charged for services that should otherwise be cov-
ered by government benefits and therefore offered free
of charge to them:
Respondent: Here even to get a card (medical card)
you need money.
Respondent: Even if you go there (Thika Hospital)
critically ill, you must buy a card before you are
attended to.
Respondent: And that’s in a government hospital.
In addition to these auxiliary charges participants were
also curious as to why PLHIV are often l turned away by
providers when they are ill, “another thing in this hos-
pital is, when you go on a Saturday or a Sunday and
they see your card has CCC1 written on it, they tell you
to come back on Monday. Group D. Thus, participants
illustrated how the quality, accessibility, and costs of
care vary widely despite government efforts to fund and
standardize services and also noted variations in the way
providers treated PLHIV. Their conversations therefore
centered around reasons why PLHIV did not receive
comparable treatment across all public centers, and
where the resources clearly intended for them were
directed.
Community health workers (CHW) are a critical
part of the HIV support system in Kenya. Respon-
dents discuss how community workers benefit from
concrete supports that are meant for PLHIV, which
leads to greater out-of-pockets costs. One participant
describes a situation where a CHW stole blankets
intended for her children:
Respondent: I want to ask something, these CHW, for
example there was a time they asked us to fill forms
where I live. The lady asked for a hundred shillings for
each child. I gave 300 shillings for my children and
returned the form to her. Only one child was issued a
blanket, the other two got none, and remember we
paid a hundred shillings for each form. As the CHW
she said she had people she was caring for and took 3
blankets to take to them. Later she was asked whether
she had taken those blankets to the people and it
turned out she hadn’t. The blankets were taken from
her house by the Headman. She said they would have
to wait for her to bring them because she was already
using them in her house. You see, they hide these
things from the people they are expected to benefit.
Respondent: And that person gets paid to work, they
are salaried.
Respondent: They ask us for all this money and they
forget we have to work very hard to get it, even go
without some things so that they can forward those
forms for you. Group B
Participants expressed outrage and disappointment
that a paid professional would exploit a patient, espe-
cially one who is also experiencing financial struggles.
Conversation continued and participants speculated that
CHWs might engage in these behaviors because many
are not HIV infected and do not relate to the patients
they serve. Recruiting and training CHWs from the
PLHIV community was proposed as a counter to this ex-
ploitation. Participants argued that CHWs who share a
diagnosis with their clients might be more inclined to
empathize with and therefore provide better services to
the community as described by one participant in Group
B: “If CHW has HIV it’s okay … they will relate because
the person they are helping has HIV too.” Group B.
Economic empowerment is a strategy that has been
used in the public and private sectors to address the
HIV epidemic. Given the economic burden of a sero-
positive diagnosis and the high poverty rates in the re-
gion, income-generating activities were discussed by all
groups as interventions that strengthen this population
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both economically and socially. For instance, partici-
pants from Group A discussed the merits of their rabbit
rearing business which served a threefold purpose: a
much needed and affordable protein for group members,
a source of income when excess products are sold to
local communities, and finally as an activity that keeps
the group socially engaged and connected.
Given the preeminence of income in the fight against
HIV, financial institutions play a key role in the response
system. Participants from groups B, C, and D discussed
how proposals written by PLHIV meant to bolster their
economic functioning are often un-funded or when
funded the resources are directed towards non-affected
groups. Participants argue that a sero-positive status,
their low-income status, and tribal affiliation is used to
discriminate against funding for group projects, “as
members we write proposals. But when you write this
proposal, you hear that another group benefited but the
one that has HIV people questions are asked about how
they will repay a loan” Group B. Respondents are indeed
committed to securing their economic well-being and
do make the necessary efforts to attend the relevant
trainings in the hope of receiving financial supports
which are not always forthcoming, “we were trained for
6 months and we did not get any support” Group C.
Participants proposed several solutions to the issues
they had identified. To reduce discrimination, group
members discussed the importance of having a represen-
tative voice and equity in the service provision system.
Representation is viewed as a way in which agencies can
be held accountable during service provision. Specific-
ally, respondents highlight the benefits of including their
peers as representatives on these government councils.
Respondent: I would also like us to talk about the
government, yes the government is saying that its
giving us support but those who have been given the
mandate to help us are benefiting themselves.
Respondent: For example the government gives food to
those who are HIV positive and those who are supposed
to supply the food are selling the food, those who are in
charge are not affected like us and the people who are
chosen are not HIV positive… In case there is any
support that is given we should have representatives…
we should know the representatives very well. Group C
The solution of representation was further elaborated
when the group members continued their discussion:
Interviewer: There should be a representative?
Respondent: Yes, the money should not be distributed
by the government.
Respondent: One of us should be involved in the
distribution of that money.
Respondent: We should be the ones who are supposed
to be given the money.
Respondent: …we also get people who usually come
and tell us to fill forms, give our passport photos, ID
and those documents are going to be dumped so we
don’t believe anyone.
Respondent: They make money off of us. Group C
Earlier, respondents expressed their belief that pro-
viders divert resources away from PLHIV because they
do not understand or relate to PLHIV. Thus, respon-
dents assume that by having PLHIV involved in decision
making and service provision, providers will be less
likely to take or misallocate resources, thereby increasing
accountability within the system.
Institutional level
At the institutional level participants perceived a system
that is permissive of corrupt government officials, mis-
direction of national resources intended for PLHIV, and
a difficult to access response system. One of the ways
this manifests is the collusion of government officials
with relatives and non-relatives alike to deny PLHIV of
critical economic resources. Again, given the strong as-
sociation between HIV and economic disenfranchise-
ment, the theft and misappropriation of their meager
resources is especially detrimental to their well-being.
Participants shared a variety of situations where family
members and village elders deliberately colluded with
government officials to misdirect resources intended for
them. Both genders identified women as being especially
vulnerable. For example, one participant from Group B
describes how relatives bribe legal officials to deny
widows access to land upon the death of a husband by
altering official documentation: “It comes in because as I
have told you, the brother has money, right? You the
widow are left without any money. Because of corruption,
the said brother will go and give whatever amount of
money and after a few minutes, the documents will be
given to him with his name written on them”. A partici-
pant from the same group added, “Let me contribute a
little, for instance, everywhere in this country there is an
assistant chief. The assistant chief knows everyone in
their area. They know whose wife you are, they know
who has died. If the assistant chief is bribed, your case is
closed. It starts with the administration, because the ad-
ministration in the village is the chief and assistant chief.
Whether you go to the chief or to the police station, they
all work in the same way, together”. Group B
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A male participant from group A described an experi-
ence he had where he helped a female acquaintance se-
cure legal documents: “There is a lady I went to assist to
get a death certificate at the City Mortuary. She had
tried to get one for a whole year and every time she
would go they would tell her that they already issued
one. When I went there…I found out that they had writ-
ten two death certificates. I asked why they had issued
two death certificates, had this person died twice? How
can you note two death certificates for one person?” In
this instance the document in question was a death cer-
tificate, a document which is critical to the succession
process and is used to secure household assets after the
death of a family member.
Institutional players were further identified as misdir-
ecting national resources intended for PLHIV. For in-
stance, participants from Group D noted in their
discussions instances where food and money donations
intended for PLHIV were misdirected away from these
intended target groups: “There was a time I heard that
there are donors who send food to Kenya for people who
are living the virus. Who does this food benefit because
we don’t get it”. Again, although participants are not a
part of the HIV response system, these group members
are aware of how resources ought to be allocated and
lack of access or receipt of these resources may raise
questions about proper allocation and distribution.
How is this corruption at the institutional level experi-
enced by these participants? Participants discussed situa-
tions where accountability mechanisms (in place to
prevent skimming and false claims) are circumvented
and as a result they do not receive potential services and
resources. Group C participants describe an instance
where they were asked to cooperate with information
gathering efforts by a government group seeking exter-
nal donations. Presumably, the group needed a count of
PLHIV to justify their request for funding:
Interviewer: When you sign somewhere do you usually
ask why you are signing?
Respondent: Even if we ask we are going to be cheated.
Respondent: We are usually told that there is funds
that are about to be released and the donors want to
know how (many) members we have, write your name
and sign, since you want to get support then you will
just sign, since the donor is not there to know the only
proof that he can get is by me writing my name and
signing and that’s why we have said, it’s good that you
have a recorder so that the donors can listen to us and
not you, the donors should not give the funding to
those who are not affected because they do not give us
the funds. Group C
Although participants seemed aware that their cooper-
ation might not yield any direct benefit to them (and in
fact, might only serve others’ personal gains), they com-
plied with the request anyway. Given their tremendous
financial needs, many felt as though they could not risk
not cooperating. Thus, although PLHIV are aware of the
potential use of their exploitation for others’ personal
gain, they might also often be unwillingly complicit in
corruptive behaviors because of their own dire economic
statuses. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness, when
PLHIV know that the promised assistance may never
materialize.
Feelings of mistrust as a result of exploitation were
not only reserved for government officials. Partici-
pants also detailed their growing mistrust with the re-
search community. They perceive an imbalance in
this relationship with the scales tipped towards the
researchers’ favor. To protect their own interests,
PLHIV have begun demanding monetary compensa-
tion prior to consenting to research activities, “…there
are a lot of people who call on us…they then tell us it
is possible to be helped. Then you live with that
hope…then you live waiting and that is the reason
why these days when you ask to interview a person
living with HIV they ask you for money. Because
people have realized that they are being used” Group
D. Another group member offered a poignant state-
ment on the disconnect between the data collected by
researchers and the resulting interventions that do
not seem to have a direct impact on her life, “now,
when you interview groups and go back abroad, we
the ones you have interviewed are not the ones who
benefit from the research. Doesn’t that hurt?”
To address some of these situations participants first
identify individual wealth protection mechanisms that
they can undertake to protect their economic resources
and to circumvent the collusion of family members
with corrupt government officials. Participants from all
four groups discussed at great lengths some of the
strategies they should apply to protect themselves from
economic exploitation. These include using the legal
system, the use of both oral or written wills, and divul-
ging the location and quantity of household wealth
holding to children early on to stave off disinheritance
after their deaths.
Participants also proposed several solutions to address
the institutional loop holes identified in the system in-
cluding consumer accountability and having a represen-
tative voice at the table. Such an approach would not
only deal with the misdirection of services but also pro-
mote the availability of services that are targeted and tai-
lored to this population’s specific needs. In the quote
below a participant in Group B posed a question to the
group pointing towards the need for accountability in
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funding streams. “May I ask a question? Is it possible for
example when people are writing proposals, there are
those who sit down and decide that HIV people need this
and this, is it possible two have at least two HIV Positive
people in those meetings?” This sentiment is echoed by
participants in part of a conversation that was initiated
by the interviewer. This discussion points to a level of
accountability that PLHIV would inject into the system “if
this money was in the custody of people living with AIDS
in Kenya, it would get to those who are affected because
they know all the difficulties of this disease” Group A.
Participants reported feeling infantilized by the system
and want ownership of the research process to ensure
that the results address critical problems that they en-
counter. To do so, respondents noted the importance of
community participatory research approaches:
Respondent: when you are doing your research please
tell them not to start at the top. When you start at the
top it doesn’t reach them (PLHIV), it doesn’t pay
Respondent: It doesn’t reach us. Come to the grass
root. Like now you have come to the grass root. If you
started at the top you couldn’t know anything
Respondent: Even those projects they (donors) think
they can start, they should start from the ground, send
their people here, they start from the ground. Group A
Thus by starting “at the top” participants feel as
though research studies or other externally initiated pro-
jects might not be addressing the critical problems that
they encounter and, thus, the results are not likely to
benefit them.
Discussion and implications
These findings emerged from a larger study designed to
understand intergenerational wealth transmission in
families impacted by HIV in Kenya. Perceived corruption
emerged as a salient theme during participants’ discus-
sion of their experiences. Given the research team’s
responsibility to report findings as entrusted to them by
study participants, this particular sub-study further ex-
plored consumers’ experiences and perceptions of cor-
ruption. Using transparent and rigorous data analysis
procedures, perceived instances of corruption were iden-
tified among direct care providers in health care and
other service systems and at the institutional level
among both local and high-ranking public officials. Cor-
ruption is widespread and, thus, a high priority concern
among people living in sub-Saharan Africa [39]. In this
study, participants described the corruption throughout
Kenya’s HIV response system in their own words. Cor-
ruption manifests as a variety of behaviors among public
decision makers, but differs depending on the setting.
Within healthcare organizations, other entities that serve
PLHIV, and within the larger governmental and inter-
national institutions, participants described how they be-
lieved that providers diverted medications, food, and
other resources intended for PLHIV, charged for services
that were perceived to be free, delayed treatment, or out-
right denied benefits to PLHIV. Many of these actions
could have been motivated by public officials’ or health
care workers’ personal economic interests; however, in
some of the cases described, these officials or workers
did not directly benefit. Rather, other patients or citizens
from similar tribal groups, or those who are not directly
affected by HIV benefitted from their actions by acces-
sing resources or services that may not have been mer-
ited. Although corruption is typically motivated by
direct personal gains, our study illustrates how corrup-
tive behaviors might also be motivated by the potential
to extend such gains to one’s own social group. Based on
participant perceptions, in many cases, decision makers
might be justifying their actions based on stereotypes
about PLHIV or tribal divisions.
Mitigating corruption – implications for intervention
Study findings highlight the potential for several policy
or programmatic interventions for mitigating corruption
within Kenya’s HIV response system. Chiefly, partici-
pants advocated for greater ownership of the HIV re-
sponse system in the form of PLHIV representation.
Members of all four peer support groups involved in this
study believe that including PLHIV in decision-making
could hold institutions accountable thereby creating a
more effective service delivery system. Citizen participa-
tion (and specifically participation of other PLHIV) also
encourages greater transparency in the way that re-
sources are allocated and services created. Addressing
information asymmetries would not only address the
current system inaccessibility but would also empower
the community. In other countries, transparency mea-
sures and opportunities for citizens to have a voice in
administrative and policy decisions have empowered citi-
zens to challenge corruption and ultimately improved
satisfaction with the health care system [21, 22]. These
present findings therefore add to the growing literature
that identifies advocacy among individuals and families
impacted by HIV and AIDS to be a useful tool in draw-
ing attention to harmful practices in the HIV response
infrastructure; consistent with this movement, commu-
nities in Kenya demand greater control over program-
matic interventions both at the national and local levels.
In addition to greater accountability and transparency
within Kenya’s public and private institutions, partici-
pants also identified the need for additional support for
controlling their assets and economic security. PLHIV
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are especially vulnerable to asset loss when they are set
to inherit wealth from a family member. Additional
legal protections that safeguard PLHIV from property
grabbing could ensure participants rightfully inherit
assets. In addition, further assistance with inheritance
planning could help PLHIV ensure their assets are
appropriately directed in accordance with their wishes
upon their death. Together, legal protections and fi-
nancial planning assistance could improve individuals’
control over their assets.
Our findings also highlight ethical and accountability
implications for the international community. Partici-
pants’ concerns that international aid does not reach
them point to the need for international donors to be
aware of potential resource diversions and the negative
consequences for PLHIV. For instance, USAID devel-
oped tools for assessing corruption in country and tailor-
ing anti-corruption strategies [40]. Tools such as these
that recognize each society’s unique socio-cultural, polit-
ical, and economic environment hold promise in
addressing this issue. In collaboration with government
officials, more proactive fiscal and programmatic moni-
toring and other accountability structures could help en-
sure international aid reaches the intended targets. In
addition, international researchers studying HIV treat-
ment, service needs, and experiences of PLHIV should
consider their local contributions. Consumers have a long
history of mistrust with researchers – researchers who
win external funding to study the HIV pandemic arrive
in-country and gather data directly from PLHIV. Yet,
participants rarely see the results. Furthermore, pro-
grams and policies are designed based on the interpret-
ation of that data by people outside of the community
[26]. Producing ethical and responsible research that fills
a local need calls for well-designed scientific participa-
tory approaches.
Finally, anti-corruption measures are unlikely to be suc-
cessful in Kenya without continued efforts to reduce
stigmatization and discrimination based on HIV status
and ethnic membership. Given that disclosure of HIV
sero-status is integral to procuring resources from service
providers (41) pervasive stigmas and stereotypes create a
social context that allows decision makers to rationalize
corruption [6]. So until misinformation surrounding a
HIV diagnosis is eradicated and the individual worth of
persons affected by the virus is socially elevated, corrupt
acts targeting this population may continue. At the insti-
tutional level, appealing to public service motivations and
promoting strong ethical values among decision makers
[17] will hopefully begin to address this situation.
Limitations
Because this study was not designed with the specific in-
tent of exploring corruption, we acknowledge that we may
have missed other facets of this phenomenon. Although
participants shared their personal experiences with cor-
ruption as service consumers, they might not be privy to
observing (or confirming) all forms of corruption, espe-
cially behaviors that occur among higher-level administra-
tors and officials. Thus, we recognize that these data do
not provide objective evidence of corruption but do pro-
vide preliminary evidence of the influence of consumers’
perceptions about corruption on resource acquisition,
health service access, and outcomes. In addition, the study
design precludes any local or national generalizability on
the extent to which corruption occurs or affects PLHIV.
However, these perspectives gathered from PLHIV who
are well positioned to describe their experiences with the
system are vital and should be considered in our scrutiny
of the HIV response system. Although corruption is per-
ceived to be widespread throughout Kenya, follow up re-
search is needed to determine the magnitude of the
problem, how frequently it occurs, and the resulting im-
pact on PLHIV. In addition, future research is needed that
tests the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures target-
ing government agencies as well as providers in the HIV
response system.
Conclusions
Participants place great importance on the theme of cor-
ruption as it relates to their overall well-being. This study
expands on prior literature documenting the negative con-
sequences of corruption on national economic develop-
ment and health by illustrating the impact on the daily
lives and well-being of PLHIV. Specifically, our findings
highlight how corruption in Kenya’s health system and
governmental institutions may be driven, in part, by HIV
and tribal stigmas. Based on participants’ accounts, cor-
ruption throughout the system results in fewer resources
for PLHIV. Corruption in the form of resource misappro-
priation or theft is especially deleterious given the high
cost burden already borne by the study population.
Endnotes
1Comprehensive Care Centers (CCC) are medical
centers charged with the delivery of HIV medical ser-
vices including counseling, nutrition, and other sup-
port services.
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